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MAKING (CORPORATE) LAW IN A SKEPTICAL
WORLD
LymAN P. Q. JOHNSON*

INTRODUCTION

Just when a learned judge finally confesses what many legal scholars

have insisted on for years-that "[j]udges make rather than find law, and
they use as inputs ...

their own ethical and policy preferences"'-we hear

dissent from the academy. Professor Scott Altman wonders whether candor
2
about the ticklish business of judicial lawmaking is the better course,
suggesting a little self-deceit might be more efficacious.' Professor Pierre
Schlag proposes a more radical course. 4 He wants to "destabilize" 5-perhaps
call an indefinite time-out on-the larger enterprise of normative legal

* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A.

1973, Carleton College; J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota. I thank John Jacob for archival
assistance.
1. RIcHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JUIsPRUDENCE 457 (1990). "The judge is not
merely an interpreter of legal materials. He is not only a finder but a maker of law .... ." Id.
at 29 (emphasis added).
Judge Richard Posner is not the first judge to recognize (or concede) the judicial power
to create law. Professor Levinson places Judge Posner's latest work in the tradition of another
trenchantly outspoken judge, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Sanford Levinson, Strolling
Down the Path of the Law (and toward CriticalLegalStudies?): The Jurisprudenceof Richard
Posner, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 1221, 1227-28 (1991) (book review). Posner himself claims Justice
Benjamin Cardozo as a judicial soul mate, and Cardozo unreservedly acknowledged a judge's
influence in forming (not just "finding") law. BENJAMIN CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JumctiA PROCESS 113-15, 167-80 (1921). And although Posner slights the legal realists, certainly
Judge Jerome Frank-before turning to "natural law"-emphasized the importance of personal
belief to judicial lawmaking. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100-17 (1930).
See Levinson, supra, at 1231 n.48. Notwithstanding these distinguished forerunners, the decided
tendency among judges appears to be either an indignant denial of, or an embarrassed silence
about, such authority.
2. Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296, 296 (1990).
3. Strictly speaking, Professor Altman states that he takes up the issue of judicial
introspection more than that of judicial candor. Id. at 297. Occasionally, though, he writes
as though candor itself is an issue for judges. Id. at 350-51. For scholars, as opposed to
judges, Altman recognizes that the predicament is more pointedly one of candor: By frankly
insisting that judges be introspective about how they fashion law do we damage the lawmaking
process? Id. at 347-51 & n.156. Altman believes the answer might be "yes." For a critical
response to Altman's argument, see Gail Heriot, Way Beyond Candor, 89 MiCH. L. REv.
1945 (1991).
4. Pierre Schlag, Normativity And The Politics Of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801
(1991) [hereinafter Normativity]; Pierre Schlag, Normative And Nowhere To Go, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 167 (1990).
5. Schlag, Normativity, supra note 4, at 932.
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thought, believing it to be a shield deflecting attention from the "dubious"
6
ends to which such work is often put.
Judge Richard Posner unflinchingly concedes the force of modem
jurisprudential critiques of law and lawmaking. In some ways, his recent
work actually bolsters and extends those critiques. And his ten years on the
bench not only make him an unlikely candidate for launching such a
powerful reproach to conventional legal thought, they enrich and enliven a
subject that can suffer from an overly abstract, speculative, or politically
7
charged treatment.
Recent critiques of judicial lawmaking are multifaceted, but at a minimum they are deeply skeptical of "objective" or determinate answers to
legal issues. 8 Too, they reject any foundationalist view of law as a body of
autonomous rules "containing" pre-ordained (and so authoritatively pedigreed) meaning, or as being derived from an apolitical and timeless sector
of the universe sealed off from other realms of human experience. Posner
joins that chorus (to a point), 9 but responds with his own
"antifoundationalist" 10 answer to the resulting dilemma of judicial legitimacy. His answer-appearing in chapter 15 as a "manifesto"-is what he
calls "pragmatism," something he describes as "an attitude rather than a
dogma ;"" an attitude that, after he's done pummeling other approaches
to law, Posner believes will "emerge as the natural alternative."' 2 The
pragmatic "attitude" preferred by Posner is one which
embraces the scientific virtues (open-minded, no-nonsense inquiry),
elevates the process of inquiry over the results of inquiry, prefers
ferment to stasis, dislikes distinctions that make no practical difference . . . is doubtful of finding 'objective truth' in any area of
inquiry, is uninterested in creating an adequate philosophical foundation for its thought and action, likes experimentation, likes to
kick sacred cows, and-within the bounds of prudence-prefers
shaping the future to maintaining continuity with the past.,3

6. Id. at 805.
7. I wish to emphasize the word "overly" in the text. I see nothing wrong with legal
writing that is abstract, speculative, or politically charged, provided that not all of the work
in that area displays those qualities or that any work displays them to excess.
8. Posner states that legal rules "may be so much putty." Posner, supra note 1, at 52.
For elaboration of the critical perspective, see David Millon, Objectivity And Democracy, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1992); Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: A PoliticalHistory,
100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
9. Although Posner criticizes those who naively seek autonomy and objectivity in law,
he also rejects certain critical stances toward those quests: "Efforts in this scientific and
pluralistic age to regain a confident sense in the law's autonomy and objectivity seem futile.
Yet the radical skepticism and vague communitarian yearnings of critical legal studies are a
dead end too." POSNER, supra note 1, at 458. See Levinson, supra note I, at 1226 n.23.
10. PosNER, supra note 1, at 29.
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id.
13. Id.

MAKING (CORPORATE) LAW

1992]
Put another way,

[p]ragmatism in the sense that I find congenial means looking at
problems concretely, experimentally, without illusions, with full
awareness of the limitations of human reason, with a sense of the
"localness" of human knowledge, the difficulty of translations
between cultures, the unattainability of "truth," the consequent
importance of keeping diverse paths of inquiry open, the dependence
of inquiry on culture and social institutions, and above all the
insistence that social thought and action be evaluated as instruments
4
to valued human goals rather than as ends in themselves.
Whatever the merits of Judge Posner's proposal to lead us out of the
contemporary jurisprudential thicket, he insists that we scrap our decrepit
illusions about law and unblinkingly acknowledge our whereabouts. Only
then, he claims, can we fruitfully rethink our notions of law and lawmaking.
What could more succinctly capture the nub of the problem we can't avoid
grappling with than the following statement?
[I]f we give a difficult legal question to two equally distinguished
legal thinkers chosen at random, we may well get opposite answers. 5
There is, in other words, no singularly right or pre-existing solution to
legal questions patiently awaiting judicial discovery. This is necessarily so
because there are "no overarching concepts of justice that our legal system
can seize upon to give direction to the [lawmaking] enterprise." 1 6 Thus,
according to Posner, the usual methodology of picking up the legal scent
on a given issue and doggedly following it to the hoped-for destination of
our quarry (the uniquely right answer) is misguided. There isn't any answer
"out there;" consequently, Posner contends that the "pragmatist's real
interest is not in truth at all but in belief justified by social need."' 17 For
many, this assertion introduces an unnerving, possibly treacherous, latitude
into the task of judicial lawmaking. Judges seem unconstrained, free to
interpret "social need" (and how it is best achieved) as they choose, and
so free to decide with enormous discretion. Posner is not disturbed. With
the glee of one knowingly breaching standard protocol, he embraces the
fact that a "judge in the difficult case ... may be as freewheeling as a
legislator."' 8 Furthermore, Posner insists, we are troubled by such assertions
only because we in the profession make too much of law as a unique set
of problem-solving techniques, whereas in fact "there is no such thing as
'legal reasoning." ' " 9 Nor should law be regarded as a set of mental concepts
at all. It is more properly understood, Posner argues, in instrumental terms,

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 465.
Id. at 428.
Id.at 460.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 459.
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that is, as an ongoing "activity" wherein change should be expected and
often will occur not because of logic, but instead will "come about as a
result of a non-rational process akin to conversion." '2
Posner's book is laced with such arresting and sacred cow-kicking
assertions. No purpose is served here in trotting them out to demonstrate
his larger claim that franker, less occluded discourse about lawmaking is
all to the good. The key point here is that these uncommonly blunt words
come from a person whose own livelihood is judging. We wouldn't be
surprised by-indeed, we may have come to expect-such a forceful plea
for candor from the legal academy. 21 During the past fifteen years or so,
critical legal scholars have extended the critique of earlier legal realists and
have assailed those other scholars (and judges and practicing lawyers) who
continue to speak and think about law in highly doctrinal or "formal"
terms. Although now fairly deeply penetrated into the thinking and vocabulary of many scholars, 22 to hear such a learned, influential and
"conservative'"' judge as Richard Posner make a similar entreaty is quite
startling. One can only wonder what other judges say about such things at
their various klatches where, being among peers, they can let their judicial
hair down. Do they really speak to each other about their common tasks
in the formalist lexicon Judge Posner assails, or is that stilted mode of
discourse reserved for the case reports? At a minimum, Posner's brethren
and sisters on the bench cannot ignore the man, however fraught with peril
Professor Altman might regard such widespread judicial grappling. Posner's
book, in effect, offers an occasion for deciding either to broaden the
conversation about such essential matters to include the practicing profession, or to sequester it within the halls of academia.
With the hope that Professor Schlag will not rebuke for posing the
wrong questions, 24 one might ask: What have such seemingly rarified jurisprudential matters to do with corporate law? What have they to do with
Justice Lewis Powell? Regarding the first question, legal scholars of various
stripes struggle with the implications of jurisprudential skepticism for their
own special areas. Most of the hand wringing has been done by "public
law" types. 2 Corporate law scholars have largely stayed out of the fray,
preferring to huddle together in their own comer of the field. This cannot
go on much longer. If contemporary corporate law's somewhat narrow
20. Id.; see id. at 148-53.
21. But see Altman, supra note 2.
22. Perhaps the risk now is that certain critical ideas have become so much a part of
the vocabulary that they become commonplace and lose their "bite." Recently, I heard a
presentation of what was basically an empirical study of the proliferation of legal symposia
that was couched-to no great purpose or advantage, in my view-in some of the language
of critical legal studies.
23. As Professor Levinson rightly notes, Posner's book may usefully cause some rethinking of the meaning of this word and of the phrase "critical legal studies." Levinson, supra
note 1, at 1248-52.
24. Schlag, Normativity, supra note 4, at 804-05.
25. See Millon, supra note 8.
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intellectual province-the study of the shareholder-manager relationship-is
not especially earth-shaking, the institutions forming its subject matterlarge "private" multinational businesses-are increasingly and disturbingly
vital to everyone's well-being. Shouldn't the jurisprudential underpinnings,
methodologies, mindsets, and professional rhetoric of those who study these
social institutions be subjected to a full-barreled, candid and deeply skeptical
examination? I think so, and I think just as Posner understands (like
Holmes before him) the social situatedness of law and lawmaking, so it
may take an "external" sociological critique of corporate law's insular and
highly individualistic normative premises to broaden its scope. 26
I expect that such a task will not bear fruit "internally" until the latest
attraction-fascination with institutional shareholders-turns out to be an
interesting side road but ultimately a dead end insofar as coming to grips
with deeper issues that plague contemporary corporate law is concerned.
Although pockets of discontent as to the very definition of corporate law
are increasingly apparent even within the community of corporate law
scholars, the mainstream continues to examine (with imagination, to be
sure) more traditional concerns. Not expecting significant change in the
dominant compass guiding modern corporate law for the foreseeable future,
I hope, nonetheless, to emphasize in this essay my own preference for
greater transparency about what is at stake in the manifold inquiries that
constitute corporate law. In doing so, I hope to make clear my willing
acceptance of the messier rhetoric flowing out of a plain-spokenness of the
sort Posner now advocates, but which he himself may have ignored (or
even hindered) in some of his earlier writing on law that trumpeted overmuch
the determinative value of tidy "scientific" economic analysis. 27 At the same
time, I have a nagging doubt as to whether today's judicial lawmakers can
so deftly ride the pragmatic route out of a postmodern divide in world
outlook that goes well beyond law, and which threatens only to deepen,
not abate. 21 Openness about the source of inputs into decisionmaking may
only make the depth of "cosmological" disagreement about bedrock matters-e.g., the dispute over the enduring versus provisional quality of human
thought and awareness-that much more visible. Let's also be candid, then,
about why formalism in (corporate) law and elsewhere, by masking (and
thus evading) deep normative conflict, continues to be such an attractive
refuge.
As to Justice Powell, during his tenure on the Supreme Court he wrote
two opinions which spoke to a burning corporate law issue of the 1980shostile corporate takeovers. 29 He did so in two quite different discourses.
26. Recent examples include ROBERT BELL n ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 82-110 (1991);
ALAN WOLF, WHOSE YEEPER?: SocIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION (1989).
27. RICHARD POSrER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). See infra note 61. Cf.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 387 (stating that: "we should be cautious in pushing wealth
maximization; incrementalism should be our watchword").
28. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
29. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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The first opinion, a concurring opinion written in 1982, was brief and
somewhat tentative and undeveloped, but it was far more cut from the freespeaking and pragmatic mold espoused by Judge Posner, probably because
it expressly advocated the propriety of factoring state law solicitude for
nonshareholder interests into the constitutional assessment of state antitakeover eover legislation, hardly an orthodox corporate law position. The
opinion thus stood as a quiet admonition to a developing swagger in certain
free-market quarters of corporate law. The second, a majority opinion
written in 1987, was more elaborate, reached a decidedly antishareholder
result, but spoke in a conventional, narrow and formalistic (if not downright
disingenuous) proshareholder discourse. To use Professor Altman's terminology, the lack of candor seemed to "work" well in the latter opinion,
reaching an unorthodox (from corporate law's vantage point) result, but
doing so behind a veil of wholly conventional terminology.
In periods of intellectual transition, does altered, more capacious rhetoric always candidly lead (as Powell's earlier opinion seemed to portend)or does it sometimes bashfully trail (as seen in the semantic pretense of
Powell's later opinion)3 °-genuine innovation in lawmaking? In a world
both skeptical and splintered, which is the preferred approach to making
law, here corporate law, but applicable elsewhere as well? The subject of
this brief Essay is to use Justice Powell's two opinions as a window into a
larger debate, a debate rightly seen by Judge Posner as affecting all fields
of law, a debate corporate law should acknowledge and join, a debate (not
seen by Posner) implicating very fundamental matters lying "outside" what
today we call law.

Two TAKEOVER CASES
The 1980s witnessed an accelerating level of hostile takeover activity.
These transactions-essentially en masse stock sales by existing shareholders
to third party offerors-took place on national capital markets. They yielded
immense wealth for investors who, understandably, delighted in both the
wealth and enhanced stature in corporate governance brought by these
transactions. The salutary effect of these transactions for corporate governance (as that field is traditionally defined) cannot be overestimated. For
decades, corporate law had struggled with the problem of shareholder
powerlessness in displacing or disciplining incompetent or underperforming
managers. Takeover bids-being aimed directly at shareholders rather than
being mediated through management, as is the case with most corporate

30. Writing in 1921, Judge Cardozo recognized that often the transition from an outdated
legal notion to a newer idea was "bridged by the pious fraud of a fiction." CARnozo, supra
note 1, at 116. But he spoke prematurely when he said:
Today the use of fictions has declined; and the springs of action are disclosed where
once they were concealed.
Id. at 117. Perhaps Cardozo, in 1921, was not so much describing prevailing practice as he
was doing what Posner was doing in 1990-exhorting.
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decisions-offered a simple and efficient remedy for this dilemma. Unhappy
shareholders simply sold their stock at a premium to someone who, acquiring
a majority position, had every incentive to exercise legal power to replace
incumbent management with faithful hand-picked agents.
For various reasons, however, state legislators were strongly opposed
to what they regarded (rightly or wrongly) as disruptive enterprise-busting
events and, accordingly, they enacted statutes aimed at curbing hostile
takeovers.3 1 In terms of interest group analysis, the interests of largely outof-state shareholders were sacrificed for the benefit of politically preferred
(and influential) in-state nonshareholder considerations.
32
Edgar v. MITE Corp.

In 1982, one such statute was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court because it impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. 3 Neither the
design of the Illinois statute at issue in the case, nor the commerce clause
analysis of Justice White's majority opinion, are important to this Essay.
Instead, I wish to focus on Justice Powell's concurring opinion. This
opinion, brief though it is, is wrongly slighted by those wishing to understand-or simply see-the subsurface turmoil in corporate law. Moreover,
it nicely displays Powell's larger centrist and localism-leaning tendencies; it
is transparently candid; and although he joined the majority in striking
down the Illinois law, Powell's unhidden sympathy for the aims of antitakeover legislation served pragmatically to inspire a new breed of what would
later prove to be successful anti takeover statuteg.
Powell first stated that he agreed with Justice Marshall that the issues
in Edgar v. MITE Corp. were moot, but that, because a majority of the
court had reached the merits, he joined Justice White's indirect commerce
clause analysis only. 4 He joined it because its "reasoning leaves some room
for state regulation of tender offers." 35 He went on to state why such public
regulation was beneficial, noting that the early 1980s were a period "marked
by conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust laws." 36 A regulatory vacuum in the antitrust arena, coupled with
what Powell perceived as an offeror's often superior capital resources and
professional personnel, "may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or
37
regional target corporation. '

31. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing The Point About State Takeover
Statutes, 87 Mxcm L. REV. 846, 846 (1989).
32. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
33. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
34. White and two other Justices considered the Illinois law also to be preeempted, and
White and three other Justices found the law to be a direct burden on interstate commerce as
well.
35. 457 U.S. at 646.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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In fact, Powell's survey of the takeover landscape was faulty. True, the
deregulation movement of the early 1980s led to the formation of some
large businesses through merger and acquisition. But these consensual transactions did not typify what was happening in "hostile" overtures. The
takeover activity of the early 1980s was not marked by the joinder of
behemoth companies (as in the 1960s), or the assault of large upon small,
but by the dismantling or "busting up" of conglomerate target companies
into smaller, more focused units. Often this was done by bidders who, far
from being representatives of the corporate establishment, basically operated
as lone wolves, empowered to do so by the awesome money-raising powers
of the now-despised junk bond. It was, in fact, the splintering and uprooting
of local enterprises, not their enlargement, that concerned state lawmakers.
Antitrust law had never spoken to the shrinking or exportation of businesses,
and so its desuetude was of no particular moment on this issue.
And yet target companies were, Powell was correct to note, still at a
"disadvantage," even if from a source other than a suspension in antitrust
enforcement. What precisely was the disadvantage which troubled Powell?
Was it the same two matters of shareholder vulnerability that so bothered
many corporate law scholars, viz, that target company shareholders might
face unaided the difficult choice presented by then-common two-tier bids
meant to stampede shareholders into tendering their stock at an unreasonably
low price, or the possibility that incumbent management would rebuff the
overture altogether rather than extract the maximum share price for investors? These shareholder-centered issues were not Powell's concerns. Instead,
he described the "adverse consequences" of unregulated takeover activity
as being those to the "general public interest. . .

."'

Especially upsetting

to the.general public interest, according to Powell, is the disruptive effect
'39
"when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and State."
Powell elaborates on this last point in a footnote describing how the
"headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations tend to
be located in the large cities of a few States."'' When a headquarters is
moved to one of those cities, Powell notes (or maybe "speculates" is a
more accurate word) that "the State and locality from which the transfer
is made inevitably suffer significantly." 41 This occurs because the target
company management's important leadership role in community affairs is
lost and contributions to "cultural, charitable, and educational life ...

also

tend to diminish ...."42
Powell's greatest familiarity with city life was with Richmond, Virginia,
where before going on the bench he had lived, practiced law, and played a
significant role in civic and cultural life. He was president of the Family

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 646 n.*.
Id.
Id.
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Service Society, a local agency that provided assistance to needy people. He
was elected to the Special Charter Commission, which recommended the
city manager form of government for Richmond. He was active in the
Richmond Bar Association long before he became president of the American
Bar Association, he wrote occasional columns for the Richmond Times
Dispatch, and he both chaired the Richmond School Board during the
stormy school desegregation era of that city and was a member of a group
called the Virginia Industrialization Commission which, among other activities, worked to end the practice of massive resistance in Virginia. By his
own efforts he vouched for the importance of active involvement in community life.
No doubt, too, as a corporate lawyer Powell knew firsthand the
enormous contributions of time and energy his clients had made to the civic
life of Richmond. Powell's notion of what counts for the "general public
interest," and how the business and professional elites of a city can and
should contribute to it, surely reflect his patrician bent and may be too
genteel and narrow for some people's likes. Moreover, Richmond's unique
role in southern history and culture might by itself lead to the harboring
of suspicion about persons who "take over"-in other words, are not
invited to have an interest in-another company. But the larger point is
that Powell had a pivotal experiential context for his belief that state law
could rightly play a role in preserving those enterprises and endeavors that
contributed to his understanding of community interests, interests at once
more localized and broader than those of shareholders. In short, whether
self-consciously or not, Powell looked at the issue of takeover regulation
with what Posner describes as elements of the pragmatic attitude: that is,
to look at problems with "a sense of the 'localness' of human knowledge,
the difficulty of translations between cultures, ... [and] the dependence of
-43
inquiry on culture and social institutions ....
Powell displayed here an instinct deeply protective of those business
and civic institutions he knows well and the leadership of which he largely
trusts and respects. In substance, this may not be Posner's cold-eyed judicial
pragmatism as much as it is a strain (with a Virginian tinge) of an old-line
conservatism showing through, the kind that manifests "a serious interest
in institutions like the family, church, the local community, the private
sector for their value as buffering or mediating forces and for their role in
preserving a more diverse and pluralistic social order." 44 It is a kind of
conservatism quite different than the libertarian "free-market" brand that
many corporate scholars, buoyed by the Reagan revolution, believed robust
takeover activity should both reflect and hasten along. Their vision, in fact,
prevailed in MITE because the decision, after all, did strike down the Illinois
market-clogging law; and it did so by an embarrassingly naive and enthu-

43. PosNER, supra note 1, at 465.

44. Robert Nisbet, The Present Age And The State Of Community, CHRoiNicLs, June
1988, at 11, 17.
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siastic recitation of the evil that would allegedly befall interstate commerce
were the Illinois law upheld:
Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at
a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest
valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition,
is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides
incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain
4
high is reduced. 1
Sandwiched between the two sentences describing how takeovers help
investors is White's unsupported statement attempting to connect takeovers
to the economic interests of society at large. In this sense, to use Professor
Scot Powe's terminology,4 MITE was a "nationalizing" decision, even
though it was reached in 1982, not in the broader nationalizing era of 193773. It is a sort of judicial outlier, a seeming stray that used federal law to
drum out state regulation of large-scale stock transfers so as to create an
unfettered national market for corporate control. What is extra odd about
the case is that the nationalizing effort does not, as in the earlier 1937-73
era, originate from the political left, but comes instead from the political
right. The right (as in libertarian deregulatory right), because of its freemarket bent, needed potent legal weaponry to displace market-gumming
state and local laws, just as, in an earlier day, substantive due process and
the contract clause shielded conunercial activity from state intrusion. 47 The
only weaponry of sufficient constitutional stature for this task was federal
law, and so its formidable path-clearing force was invoked. The result, postMITE, was a sweeping away of the constitutional obstacles so that hostile
takeovers could proceed relatively unhindered. The mid-1980s, in fact,
brought forth an astounding upsurge in such activity.
From corporate law's limited vantage point, this was all to the good
because shareholders benefitted immensely. Powell could not have failed to
know this. Speaking in MITE to the question of whether the singularly pro-

45. 457 U.S. at 643.
46. L.A. Powe, Jr., The Court Between Hegemonies, 49 WAsi. & LEE L. REv. 31
(1992).
47. Today, adherents of this outlook appear to center their arguments around the issue
of whether excessive regulation amounts to a "taking" requiring just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 60 U.S.L.W. 3371 (U.S.
Nov. 19, 1991). To the extent this succeeds-and at least Justices Scalia and Thomas are
probably receptive to it-the ability of governments (whether federal, state, or local) to
"regulate" property and business activity may be dramatically reduced. One upshot is that at
least some commercial activity, being less bounded, may tend toward an expansive and
"nationalizing" reach. Here, then, the judicial hegemonic shift identified by Professor Powe,
supra note 46, may have an ironic counter-shifting economic effect. This raises in new form
a paradox evident at least since John Stuart Mill: Those on the political left value libertarianism
for personal freedoms, while those on the right value it for economic freedoms. Sometimes,
therefore, federal law is deployed to mount an assault on public regulation from the political
left, sometimes from the right.
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investor focus of the federal Williams Act preempted state law that might
48
protect corporate enterprises for the civic reasons he had earlier mentioned,
Powell stated he did not read that Act to "necessarily imply a congressional
intent to prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at least in some
circumstances-greater protection to interests that include but often are
broader than those of incumbent management." 49 Here he not only spurns
as fanciful a libertarian, nationalizing and uniform policy on stock transfers
as achieved through a misreading of federal law, he rejects-because he is
skeptical of-the very core premise of corporate orthodoxy that the corporate world has but two important parties-shareholders and managersand that to disfavor the former in hostile takeovers is to be a lackey of the
latter. Such a cramped bi-polar view of corporate activity and corporate
law, to Powell, leaves out other nonshareholder, nonmanagement "interests" and the "general public interest" as being entirely proper-however
awkwardly expressed-ingredients for state policy toward takeovers.
Powell's concurrence, much more than White's opinion, speaks the
language of deference to "localism" that marks the court's larger direction
in 1982, a transitional time. 50 Much more than the other four Justices who
joined him in the result, he strove to connect this apparently deviant
nationalizing decision to the Court's overall orientation. Thus, although the
immediate effect of the holding in MITE was to unleash a wave of takeover
activity, the longer term outcome of Powell's special concurrence was to
inspire state lawmakers to return to the drawing board to design laws that
could more artfully do what Powell had invited. Eventually, those efforts
5
succeeded. '
Another trait of Powell's opinion in MITE is its directness and candor.
Perhaps this is a virtue of writing a concurring or dissenting opinion; one
can speak one's mind freed of the necessity-often found in majority
opinions-of having to write to induce others to join. 52 In any event, Powell
spoke honestly as to why he thought state law could regulate takeovers,
and he did not house it in the cant of shareholder welfare. He bluntly
expressed his concern about the disruptive effects of takeovers on a broader
network of corporate constituents. This more candid language had, ultimately, a very pragmatic outcome. Coming in a decision widely regarded
as a stinging defeat for state law, it powerfully signalled state lawmakers,
target companies, and their legal advisors of a lurking judicial receptivity
to their enterprise-protecting concerns. The trick, of course, for those
crafting such laws was to produce the desired effects constitutionally.
Doing so led, ironically and regrettably, to a retreat from candor about
motives to a sort of disingenuousness. This is because, after MITE, to

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
457 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added).
See Powe, supra note 46.
See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
I thank my colleague Denis Brion for this insight.
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preserve a constitutional role for state law in the regulation of hostile
takeovers that law had to be peddled as something squarely within the
competence of state lawmaking authority. It turns out that corporate law
itself is that "something." The making of corporate law had always been
within the province of state rather than federal law.53 Thus, antitakeover
laws, in order to follow up on Powell's strong signal, were lodged in
corporate statutes themselves.
The problem is that the deep structure and rhetoric of corporate law
operated on a different (latent) predicate, namely, that it ordered only the
shareholder-manager relationship, not a wider network of interactions, and
that it did so toward the end of shareholder wealth maximization, not the
well-being of other groups. Seeking the constitutional safety of state corporate law to protect interests traditionally alien to the very subject matter
and thrust of that law required one of two outcomes. First, the scope of
corporate law itself might genuinely be expanded to encompass more than
the shareholder-manager relationship. Second, the advancement of nonshareholder interests (including managerial interests) through antitakeover
laws might dishonestly be described within the straitjacket of traditional
rhetoric as being, of all things, good for shareholders. Although I believe
the first is the better course and will, over the longer term, be the eventual
outcome in corporate law, that tack was a bit too radical for many defenders
of state regulation even in the near-desperate period just after MITE.
Instead, the traditional shareholder-centered rhetoric was drawn on, and
what was undoubtedly anti-shareholder legislation was advanced as investor
friendly.5 4 In many quarters, this was done, however, solely to win the
constitutional fight, not to genuinely reform corporate law. 55 Ultimately,
the constitutional strategy worked.
56
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America

In 1987, one of the retooled anti-takeover statutes (Indiana's) was
challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court.5 7 Justice Powell wrote the
majority opinion, one of his last on the bench. Unlike his concurring
opinion in MITE, Powell's opinion in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America was replete with references to the manner in which the statute's
requirement of a shareholder plebiscite on transfers of voting control

53. See Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 485
(1991).
54. This is an example of how a change in legal thought is, as Cardozo put it, sometimes
"bridged by the pious fraud of a fiction." See supra note 30.
55. Whether those allies of management who defended antitakeover legislation on behalf
of nonshareholder interests can easily distance themselves from the full force of their rhetoric
remains to be seen. For an effort to take seriously the nonshareholder aspects of anti-takeover
legislation, see David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv. 223 (1991).
56. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
'57. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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purportedly benefitted investors and thereby served the same "investor
protection" goal as the Williams Act:
[T]he statute now before the Court protects the independent shareholder against both of the contending parties....
.. By allowing such shareholders to vote as a group, the Act
protects them from the coercive aspects of some tender offers....
. . . The principal result of the Act is to grant shareholders the
power to deliberate collectively about the merits of tender offers.
This result is fully in accord with the purposes of the Williams
Act. 8
The thrust of Powell's analysis was that Indiana's statute was not
preempted by the Williams Act precisely because, supposedly, it protected
shareholder interests. This line of reasoning simply ignored the troubling
fact that it was shareholder inability to discipline management for its
perceived failings by traditional legal means-e.g., proxy contests or corporate derivative actions-that made a market-based mechanism like takeovers such an attractive governance instrument.
The dominant theme of Powell's Commerce Clause analysis was also
shareholder protection:
The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the shareholders of
Indiana corporations....
... In our view, the possibility of coercion in some takeover
bids offers additional justification for Indiana's decision to promote
the autonomy of independent shareholders....
.. It only provides regulatory procedures designed for the better
protection of the corporation's shareholders. 9
Focusing on shareholder well-being, Powell only obliquely acknowledged,
as he did much more forthrightly in MITE, the disruptive effect of takeovers
on a state's economy. He pointed out, with no elaboration, the interest of
states "in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the
corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such
corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs." 6° Here Powell
was struggling to reconcile investor welfare with a more organic, inclusive
conception of corporate relationships. Lacking any corporate law vocabulary
for doing so, he was less than clear in stating exactly what weight state
efforts to protect "stable relationships"-presumably, a veiled reference to
noninvestor interests-should be given in Commerce Clause analysis. Moreover, by ultimately making the myth of shareholder protection the central
part of his constitutional analysis, he simply sidestepped the harsh reality

58. 481 U.S. at 82-83 & n.7.
59. 481 U.S. at 91-93.
60. 481 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added).
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that many states, acting out of perceived (rightly or wrongly) self-interest,
have sought to impair the free workings of the interstate capital markets to
hurt, not help, shareholders. Perhaps framing the matter in terms of investor
welfare was necessary to corral enough votes to command a majority, but
that is simply a basis for sharing the blame for insincerity; it is no answer
to it.
CTS, in upholding Indiana's anti-takeover statute, sent the law of
takeovers back to the states. It rebuffed efforts to use either a relatively
modest piece of federal legislation (the Williams Act) or the Commerce
Clause to nationalize corporate law through the back door. In this respect,
CTS rejects the "nationalizing" tilt of MITE and achieves a more deferential
"localizing" effect consistent with the court's larger-and by 1987, more
pronounced-hegemonic shift. It transfers the locus of decisionmaking about
the shape and function of corporate law at a price, however, both for the
field of corporate law and for the larger task of judicial lawmaking.
Within corporate law, takeovers seemed to bring resoltion-"closure"
might not be too strong a word for the sense of hopefulness it conveysto decades of perplexity, and were much prized as a result. And yet the
jolting effect on large numbers of people put takeovers on everybody's
minds, thereby drawing the concerns of corporate law out of the margins
of cultural awareness squarely into the center. Once drawn out-however,
briefly-corporate law's exclusive and little-known fascination with investor
well-being was viewed by many as possibly inconsistent with other considerations. Thus, for corporate law in the 1980s, takeovers initially represented
great promise but ended by bringing deep challenges to that field's core
premises.
The outcome (if not language) of CTS was a sensitivity to widely held
reservations about the value of high levels of takeover activity. As a resulting
constitutional matter, corporate law's traditional pro-shareholder focus was
not immune to the blunting influence of non-shareholder considerations.
And yet, by achieving this constitutional outcome within the traditional
mode of shareholder-centered discourse, post-CTS the legacy of hostile
takeovers for corporate governance continues to be fussed over by a
specialized (quite small) interpretive community of scholars operating within
the confines of certain categories of thought that state takeover regulation
had successfully challenged in the larger society. Powell reinforced that
continuing use of a narrow lens and a frail lexicon in CTS by speaking as
though Indiana's statute were truly pro-shareholder when it was designed
to be quite the opposite. Had he addressed the workings of that statute in
the candid fashion he had adopted in MITE, the rhetoric of corporate law
could have been usefully stretched-quite in line, I believe, with larger
social currents-while the same constitutional outcome would have been
reached.
DEALING WrTH DIssONANcE

At critical junctures-and the 1980s were such for corporate law-it is
sensible to encourage experimentation in thought and practice rather than
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uniformity. Whatever Judge Posner's particular thoughts on the social utility
of takeovers, 61 I believe his pragmatic sentiments are fully sympathetic to
this assertion. Localism makes inclusive approaches to problem solving more
probable, though at the ever-present risk of fractiousness. But critical
junctures arrive (or are recognized) only because of widespread dissatisfaction with, if not outright breakdown in, accepted ways of thinking and
talking about specific sets of problems. The very existence of dissatisfaction
with prevailing practices can create enormous impatience and discomfort in
those who deeply believe in the inherent "rightness" of conventional modes
of thought. And such persons will not be cheered by recalling Posner's
uncloaked view on the matter: "The pragmatist's real interest is not in
truth at all but in belief justified by social need." 62
In working through such discomfort, not only are accommodative
institutional arrangements important, but so are the attitudes of those in a
position (like judges) to address that discomfort. It is best to listen carefully,
to be candid, to confess shortcomings and doubts, to welcome an exchange
of divergent views, and to appreciate what in law appears to be the
necessarily tentative treatment of inquiries increasingly recognized as quite
open-ended. That means the customary vocabulary, range of permissible
considerations, prevailing paradigmatic mindsets and frameworks, and the
very citizenry of the interpretive community, all of which are only provisional intellectual brackets anyway, are drawn into question. In short, the
way we think about legal problems at times of doubt in a skeptical worlda world in which "bounded" orthodoxy of any sort, whether or not
grounded in a philosophically foundationalist view, is under siege-demands
both candor and a certain Janus-like tolerance for a high level of ambivalence.
This way of thinking and talking can exact a toll. Both psychological
dissonance and social discord may mount. Its full play might lead to
enormous "difficulty drawing and defending . . .line[s] .. ."63 But it is

also less daunting and more accessible because it reveals more clearly what
is at stake-an "examination of ... consequences in the world of fact."

64

The stakes-the consequences-both constitute the daily concern of practicing lawyers and judges and transcend descriptive depictions of larger epochal
movements in the law of the sort offered by Professor Powe. But this is

61. Judge Posner wrote the appellate opinion that the Supreme Court reversed. Dynamics
Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
62. POsNER, supra note 1, at 464; see supra note 17 and accompanying text. Cardozo
put it similarly: "The final cause of law is the welfare of society." CA-nozo, supra note 1,
at 66; as did Holmes: "[Tihe first requirement of a sound body of law ... [is] that it should
correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong."
OLIVER HOLSES, THE CoMMoN LAw 36 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963).
63. POSNER, supra note 1, at 467.
64. Id. "[T]ime's criticism is irrefutable, since it is reality's criticism: it sets the evidence
before us without any need to offer whys and wherefores." OcTAvio PAz, THE OrHR VoIcE:
ESSAYS ON MODERN PoEaRY 67 (1991).
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where Posner's tough-minded pragmatism may founder. Real argument over
the terms of debate on normative issues (normativity being inevitable, Schlag
notwithstanding)-and on whether civil debate can even take place-may
have only begun, now that doubt about a wide range of old verities is
seeping (rushing?) into vast regions of social experience; not just in legal
society but in that of society at large. Responses to this full working out
of post-Enlightenment angst create conflict at the most basic level,6 5 that
of cosmological outlook. Posner would leave this debate behind, but it
continually eludes finessing and seems distressingly unbridgeable. Here is
how Alan Wolfe describes the split:
At war are two fundamentally different visions of man in the world.
Modernists, inspired by life rather than revelation, begin with the
everyday and tailor their creed to adjust to its pressures. Fundamentalists, who reverse the priority, begin with an ethic and are
determined to shape modern life to fit its requirements. For the
orthodox, authority is external to the individual. For the progressive,
it is internal to the individual. 66
Posner is, in these terms, a legal "modernist" launching a heretical
broadside against an array of legal "fundamentalists," and his book-and
other critiques like it-may best be understood in terms of this deeper,
culture-wide chasm. Powell's concurrence in MITE is, much more modestly
to be sure, also "modernist" vis Avis corporate law orthodoxy. CTS moves
in that direction, while clinging to the traditional creed. Posner may be
naive to believe his brutal honesty will be widely embraced-formalism,
after all, is alive and well-or his pragmatic path followed by persons who
believe his philosophical account (for all its rich appreciation of the social
situatedness of law) ultimately does what the poet Octavio Paz described
democratic liberalism (for all its strengths) as doing: "[I]t leaves unanswered
half the questions human beings ask themselves about fraternity, about
origins and final ends, and about meaning and the value of existence." 6 7
And in rejecting foundational accounts of law, Posner utterly neglects
another enduring element in the very social landscape to which he refers
the law-the moral demands of faith and spirituality, and how they speak
to the age-old question that people won't put away: "But what is the
foundation of virtue?" Perhaps in a sort of tiny microcosm of how to
deal with this wider and loftier quest, Powell is the cagier one here, reverting
in CTS to a traditional discourse; and perhaps there is less abruptness, and

65. PAZ, supra note 64, at 2-3, 59-74.

66. Alan Wolfe, Politics By Other Means, Tsu NEw REPUBic, Nov. 11, 1991, at 39,
40 (reviewing JAMEs DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: Tim STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
(1991)).
67. PAZ, supra note 64, at 69.

68. Id. See Irving Kristol, The Future of American Jewry, 92 ComIONTARY 21, 25 (Aug.
1991) (asking "[I]f God is really dead, by what authority do we say any particular practice is
prohibited or permitted?").
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so greater regenerative value, in momentarily couching new turns in old
language.
This surely points to the importance of language, more accurately, of
rhetoric, and the way in which problems-whether scientific, cultural, or
legal-are cast. Many will shy away from Posner's call to plunge into the
icy water of skepticism, preferring to step off one ice floe only when another
one (equally tenuous in the end perhaps, but temporarily more secure) comes
within reach, hoping thereby to avoid the intermediate phase of cold
skepticism. But who will bring the new outlook within reach? Rhetoric, the
vocabulary-frail, precarious and underinclusive as it always is-in which
and by which the activity of lawmaking takes place (whether in the courtroom, law office or classroom) matters immensely,6 9 and is the means by
which a new sighting takes place. Does it precede and make it possible, or
follow and make it visible? In the roily world of corporate law, the
sentiments expressed in Powell's few sentences in MITE will endure, and
someday possibly be recognized as the true (if somewhat narrowly articulated) basis for the deference to local experimentation found in CTS but
there expressed in "a carapace of falsity and pretense [that] surrounds law
and is obscuring the enterprise. ' 70 For now, there is an emerging sense of
deficiency in speaking about matters the old way, while a new way is yet
to be devised. We want to get off our ice floe but aren't sure how.
So what isat stake in corporate law? That subject is beyond this Essay
but, very briefly, I note three points. First, after the collapse of despotic
command economies, a more mature and refined critique of the drawbacks
of unfettered market economies is more, not less, urgent. Over the past
decade, corporate law has benefitted from the insights of economic analysis.
But infatuation with and complacency about the supposedly unqualified
value of market mechanisms is no more in order in law than in the larger
political-economic sphere. A more tempered appreciation is needed.
It is impossible to fight, I know, against the market economy, or
to deny its benefits. But now that totalitarian socialism, by all
indications, is falling apart and has ceased to be a threat to
democratic societies, a new political and social way of thinking may
perhaps permit less onerous forms of exchange. This is my ardent
hope. Now that the cruel utopias that bloodied our century have
vanished, the time has come at last to begin a radical, more human
7
reform of liberal capitalist society. '
Second, a sense of the corporation as a social institution, not merely
an intersection of atomistic contracting individuals, must be made more
prominent. Sociology as well as economics must inform the study of

69. See Denis Brion, Rhetoric And The Law Of Enterprise, 42
(1991).
70. Postur, supra note 1, at 469.
71. PAz, supra note 64, at 144.
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corporations.7 2 Individual initiative is not unleashed, and material advancement does not occur, in an institutional vacuum. Corporate activity surely
shapes individual preferences and behavior as well as being shaped by them.
The "point of convergence between [individual] liberty and [social]
fraternity '7 3 must be found in, first, the vocabulary of discourse about
business activity and, second, actual patterns of commercial interaction.
Third, the creation and maintenance of productive enterprises in a
healthy sustainable manner serving the needs of a broad range of people
should always be an intensely local endeavor, 74 even in, perhaps especially
in, the dawning era of corporate restructuring and "scaling down." Some
of the growing tensions of life and thought in the post-modern bureaucratic
world might dissolve were there some sense that a shared "foundationalist"
moral compass is less critical, at least as a beginning point, than a scale or
patterning of activity that allows the hearing of voices of those many groups
of persons affected by that activity.75 As seemingly inexorable forces propel
us toward "international" and "global" interactions, and possibly away
from a shared (articulable) moral framework, the deep human longing for
a meaningful say about matters that affect one's work life should not be
forgotten by-indeed it should be central to-those who write about corporate law, as well as those judges who make it.
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73. PAz, supra note 62, at 73.
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FOR? (1990).
75. See e.g., BELLA , supra note 26, at 108 (stating: "For maximum productivity as well
as maximum job satisfaction, full participation by all in the corporation as a learning
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